GeorgeCrecy
02-23-2014, 06:21 AM
Hello, GeorgeCrecy the Hysterical Historian here! This thread will be dedicated to the Battles around South Mountain.
By the time of September 13th, Lee was in a very precarious situation. McClellan was advancing faster than he usually did, and Lee's army was spread out all over Maryland and Virginia. Jackson and the rest of his men were still besieging Harper's Ferry, and Longstreet was up near Hagerstown and Williamsport due to rumors of suspected Union garrisons and militia formed there (there was hardly 20 men between both towns). To add to this whole debacle, it also seemed that McClellan knew that Lee had his forces separated and was going to destroy it piecemeal. The only thing between him and Lee's total destruction however, was the Blue Ridge Mountains, known as South Mountain after the mountains had crossed into Maryland.
If Lee could set up some forces in the three gaps - Fox's, Crampton's, and Turner's Gaps - then he could at least forestall McClellan while his forces were regrouping. He had already sent word to all his forces to get done with what they were respectively doing, and get back to him at Sharpsburg as soon as they could. Longstreet was streaming his men south as soon as he could, and Jackson sent McLaws and the majority of his men from their position on the Maryland Heights at Harper's Ferry towards South Mountain. Even with McLaws men however, Lee only had 18,000 from Hill's Division to go against the 28,000 Union soldiers primed to turn the entire tide of the war.
Prior to the engagement on September 14th, McClellan had divided his army into three wings, with Maj. Gen. Burnside commanding the Right Wing with the I and IX Corps. The Left Wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin in command of the IV and VI Corps. Finally, the Center Wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner, in command of the II and XII Corps. The Right Wing was sent to Turner and Fox's Gap, while the Left Wing was sent towards Crampton's Gap. The Central Wing was left in reserve.
On the morning of the 14th, the situation was quite grim despite the Confederates having the superior ground. About 500 men of McLaws defended Crampton's Gap, which were sparsely spaced along a brick wall. Facing them was 12,000 men of the Left Wing commanded by General Franklin, which methodically were set up in an attacking posture for three hours before an attack was made. Farther north, General D.H. Hill and some 5,000 men set themselves into what positions they could at Turner's and Fox's Gaps against the remaining 18,000 men commanded by Burnside and Sumner of the Right and reserved Central Wing respectively. Some 11,000 men from Longstreet were on their way, but would not be there until after two o'clock at the earliest.
As the daylight hours began with burnished hues of red and orange, the Federals opened onto the northern gaps with cannon barrages for several hours. General Burnside, tasked with taking the northern two gaps, sent the IX Corps to flank General Hill from the right through Fox's Gap, while he sent Hooker and the I Corps to flank from the left. To distract the enemy, Burnside chose General Gibbons' "Black Hats" brigade - soon to be known as the "Iron Brigade" - to go up the center via the National Pike, directly at the enemy. Such an attack would have been highly successful, but Burnside did not coordinate their efforts, and the front elements of IX Corps at Fox's Gap, in this case being Cox's Division, met with the men of Gen. Samuel Garland's Brigade at 9:00 AM. The latter was outnumbered three to one and were thinly spaced out, so they were easily routed by Cox's Kanawha Division. During the Federal advance, the Confederate General Garland was mortally wounded, and was carried from the field to the South Mountain House, situated at the summit of Turner's Gap and the acting headquarters of General D.H. Hill, as well as the Confederate hospital. Garland did not delay the awaiting hands of Death for long once he arrived there. While the Federals could have continued, Cox decided to wait as the men were exhausted from their climb and fighting, and since the rest of the IX Corps had yet to arrive, let alone the rest of the Right Wing being in position to start their own assaults. This wait allowed Longstreet to arrive around 4:00 PM at Boonsboro, and quickly send his men forward to shore up the Confederate positions at Turner's and Fox's Gaps.
Back at Turner's Gap, while Cox and his men were advancing on Garland, the I Corps under Hooker had yet to get into place. By 5:00 PM, all three parts of the Right Wing were in position even as dusk was advancing rapidly to replace the much-needed light. Hooker sent his men to flank the left of Hill's men, while the "Black Hats" continued straight up the National Pike, driving the Confederates back a ways up the Gap, though not completely out due to the latter's stubborn defense. At the same time, the Confederates were on the brink of retreat from the horde of blue coming at them, but were saved only by the arrival of night and due to the rough nature of the terrain.
At Crampton's Gap, General Franklin with the VI and IV Corps was acting extremely cautiously, and set his 12,000 men up with careful preparation for three hours. Unbeknownst to him, he faced less than 1,000 men between the infantry of Gen. McLaws and some dismounted cavalry of JEB Stewart, which were thinly spaced out along a stone wall on Mountain Church Road. Once he was set up, it did not take Franklin long to capture Crampton's Gap, along with 400 prisoners. However, though McClellan in his orders specified that Franklin should take the gap and immediately continue to Harper's Ferry to relieve the garrison there, Franklin did not even move into Pleasant Valley beyond the Gap in fear of a large Confederate force that might be waiting for him (there was no such thing).
By nightfall, the Federals held the high ground in all three Gaps, but Lee's men still held the exits to the Gaps in theory. Had McClellan ordered the men to continue on the 15th, they could have easily taken Lee and what was left of McLaws in Pleasant Valley, as well as possibly Longstreet's command at Boonsboro, leaving only Jackson's men at Harper's Ferry to contend with. In effect, the war would have been over, as it would have left Richmond completely open for the picking with little resistance compared to what was had with Lee's men. The Army of the Potomac, for their part, were on the high of their first real victory after two years of hard fighting. McClellan, however, did not push his victory the following morning or during the night before, which allowed Lee and the rest of the men in the area to silently slip back towards the main meeting point at Sharpsburg. Additionally, "Little Napoleon's" inactivity also doomed the garrison at Harper's Ferry to being captured, and over 12,000 men lost which could have been used to help destroy the invading army. In all this, while it seems the Confederates had lost, were their objective to give enough time to allow their forces to converge again, then it was a Confederate victory. But, according to most newspapers of the time, South Mountain was considered a Union victory, and it also meant another nail in the coffin against the Confederacy being considered a sovereign nation by the key European powers, the final one being at Antietam. However, we shall get to that battle in our next thread.
And now, I will add a few attachments for your viewing pleasure:
537
Overview of the Actions
538
Federal troops as they passed through Middleton
539
A more in-depth look at the Northern Passes
540
541
An even more in-depth look with regimental names of the various actions both to the north and south as provided by the Civil War Trust
542
The Old Summit Inn, now known as the Old South Mountain Inn, which served as the headquarters for Gen. D.H. Hill
By the time of September 13th, Lee was in a very precarious situation. McClellan was advancing faster than he usually did, and Lee's army was spread out all over Maryland and Virginia. Jackson and the rest of his men were still besieging Harper's Ferry, and Longstreet was up near Hagerstown and Williamsport due to rumors of suspected Union garrisons and militia formed there (there was hardly 20 men between both towns). To add to this whole debacle, it also seemed that McClellan knew that Lee had his forces separated and was going to destroy it piecemeal. The only thing between him and Lee's total destruction however, was the Blue Ridge Mountains, known as South Mountain after the mountains had crossed into Maryland.
If Lee could set up some forces in the three gaps - Fox's, Crampton's, and Turner's Gaps - then he could at least forestall McClellan while his forces were regrouping. He had already sent word to all his forces to get done with what they were respectively doing, and get back to him at Sharpsburg as soon as they could. Longstreet was streaming his men south as soon as he could, and Jackson sent McLaws and the majority of his men from their position on the Maryland Heights at Harper's Ferry towards South Mountain. Even with McLaws men however, Lee only had 18,000 from Hill's Division to go against the 28,000 Union soldiers primed to turn the entire tide of the war.
Prior to the engagement on September 14th, McClellan had divided his army into three wings, with Maj. Gen. Burnside commanding the Right Wing with the I and IX Corps. The Left Wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin in command of the IV and VI Corps. Finally, the Center Wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner, in command of the II and XII Corps. The Right Wing was sent to Turner and Fox's Gap, while the Left Wing was sent towards Crampton's Gap. The Central Wing was left in reserve.
On the morning of the 14th, the situation was quite grim despite the Confederates having the superior ground. About 500 men of McLaws defended Crampton's Gap, which were sparsely spaced along a brick wall. Facing them was 12,000 men of the Left Wing commanded by General Franklin, which methodically were set up in an attacking posture for three hours before an attack was made. Farther north, General D.H. Hill and some 5,000 men set themselves into what positions they could at Turner's and Fox's Gaps against the remaining 18,000 men commanded by Burnside and Sumner of the Right and reserved Central Wing respectively. Some 11,000 men from Longstreet were on their way, but would not be there until after two o'clock at the earliest.
As the daylight hours began with burnished hues of red and orange, the Federals opened onto the northern gaps with cannon barrages for several hours. General Burnside, tasked with taking the northern two gaps, sent the IX Corps to flank General Hill from the right through Fox's Gap, while he sent Hooker and the I Corps to flank from the left. To distract the enemy, Burnside chose General Gibbons' "Black Hats" brigade - soon to be known as the "Iron Brigade" - to go up the center via the National Pike, directly at the enemy. Such an attack would have been highly successful, but Burnside did not coordinate their efforts, and the front elements of IX Corps at Fox's Gap, in this case being Cox's Division, met with the men of Gen. Samuel Garland's Brigade at 9:00 AM. The latter was outnumbered three to one and were thinly spaced out, so they were easily routed by Cox's Kanawha Division. During the Federal advance, the Confederate General Garland was mortally wounded, and was carried from the field to the South Mountain House, situated at the summit of Turner's Gap and the acting headquarters of General D.H. Hill, as well as the Confederate hospital. Garland did not delay the awaiting hands of Death for long once he arrived there. While the Federals could have continued, Cox decided to wait as the men were exhausted from their climb and fighting, and since the rest of the IX Corps had yet to arrive, let alone the rest of the Right Wing being in position to start their own assaults. This wait allowed Longstreet to arrive around 4:00 PM at Boonsboro, and quickly send his men forward to shore up the Confederate positions at Turner's and Fox's Gaps.
Back at Turner's Gap, while Cox and his men were advancing on Garland, the I Corps under Hooker had yet to get into place. By 5:00 PM, all three parts of the Right Wing were in position even as dusk was advancing rapidly to replace the much-needed light. Hooker sent his men to flank the left of Hill's men, while the "Black Hats" continued straight up the National Pike, driving the Confederates back a ways up the Gap, though not completely out due to the latter's stubborn defense. At the same time, the Confederates were on the brink of retreat from the horde of blue coming at them, but were saved only by the arrival of night and due to the rough nature of the terrain.
At Crampton's Gap, General Franklin with the VI and IV Corps was acting extremely cautiously, and set his 12,000 men up with careful preparation for three hours. Unbeknownst to him, he faced less than 1,000 men between the infantry of Gen. McLaws and some dismounted cavalry of JEB Stewart, which were thinly spaced out along a stone wall on Mountain Church Road. Once he was set up, it did not take Franklin long to capture Crampton's Gap, along with 400 prisoners. However, though McClellan in his orders specified that Franklin should take the gap and immediately continue to Harper's Ferry to relieve the garrison there, Franklin did not even move into Pleasant Valley beyond the Gap in fear of a large Confederate force that might be waiting for him (there was no such thing).
By nightfall, the Federals held the high ground in all three Gaps, but Lee's men still held the exits to the Gaps in theory. Had McClellan ordered the men to continue on the 15th, they could have easily taken Lee and what was left of McLaws in Pleasant Valley, as well as possibly Longstreet's command at Boonsboro, leaving only Jackson's men at Harper's Ferry to contend with. In effect, the war would have been over, as it would have left Richmond completely open for the picking with little resistance compared to what was had with Lee's men. The Army of the Potomac, for their part, were on the high of their first real victory after two years of hard fighting. McClellan, however, did not push his victory the following morning or during the night before, which allowed Lee and the rest of the men in the area to silently slip back towards the main meeting point at Sharpsburg. Additionally, "Little Napoleon's" inactivity also doomed the garrison at Harper's Ferry to being captured, and over 12,000 men lost which could have been used to help destroy the invading army. In all this, while it seems the Confederates had lost, were their objective to give enough time to allow their forces to converge again, then it was a Confederate victory. But, according to most newspapers of the time, South Mountain was considered a Union victory, and it also meant another nail in the coffin against the Confederacy being considered a sovereign nation by the key European powers, the final one being at Antietam. However, we shall get to that battle in our next thread.
And now, I will add a few attachments for your viewing pleasure:
537
Overview of the Actions
538
Federal troops as they passed through Middleton
539
A more in-depth look at the Northern Passes
540
541
An even more in-depth look with regimental names of the various actions both to the north and south as provided by the Civil War Trust
542
The Old Summit Inn, now known as the Old South Mountain Inn, which served as the headquarters for Gen. D.H. Hill