GeorgeCrecy
07-06-2014, 05:36 AM
Hello everyone! I am sure you have been avidly wetting yourselves in anticipation of this next post of mine, and I thought it best not to overwork your personal pee-wiping butler anymore! So, in the interest of kicking out needless employees, I bring you...
Antietam
The defeat of the Confederates at South Mountain was not a complete loss, as tactically speaking it did allow Lee and his forces time to congregate together again at Sharpsburg, a town only remarkable in the fact that it was a general central point between the various parts of the Rebel army.
As the Battles at South Mountain raged, Jackson finished up his capture of Harper's Ferry and its vast store of weapons and cannon, on top of the 15,700 Union soldiers captured. As soon as he received the order from Lee to return with all haste to Sharpsburg, he spared no time in doing so, leaving General Hill and his division to finish the parole of their new prisoners.
At South Mountain itself, the inactivity of McClellan as night fell allowed the Confederates to retreat during the evening hours, and go un-hounded all the way to Sharpsburg. General Franklin and his wing were supposed to follow through his taking of Crampton's Gap with advancing towards Harper's Ferry so as to lift the siege. But Franklin was overly cautious and was convinced that a large force was ready to pounce on him in the valley were he to go through the gap, when in reality the Confederate general McLaws had already left to also rejoin Lee.
All the gained time so freely given by Federal forces allowed the ANV to set up some defenses and set their cannons up in the best positions possible around the town of Sharpsburg and the nearby creek called Antietam. At this point, the only thing greatly worrying Lee's mind was the other half of the army under Jackson still on the way from Harper's Weekly.
McClellan, for his part, was very confident in the situation, even to the point that he felt he had Lee in a corner and bound to face total destruction, as this telegram back to the capital stated:
HEADQUARTERS, Frederick, September 13, 1862–12 m.
(Received 2.35 a. m., September 14.)
To the PRESIDENT:
I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost... I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be
severely punished for it. The army is in motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain
unchanged... I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I
can count on them as of old... Received most enthusiastically by the ladies. Will send you trophies....
GEO. B. McCLELLAN.1
However, even in this confidence, McClellan's follow-through left something to be desired. When Confederate troops left the area of South Mountain, McClellan and the majority of his force followed them through the Fox and Turner Gaps at dawn on the 15th. Franklin and his men at Crampton's Gap remained in the valley which Franklin was hesitant to go into previously, for fear of a Confederate ambush.
During this time, Lee had gathered his men around the town of Sharpsburg, if rather frantically, as his force of 25,000 odd men could not withstand for long against a force of around 80,000. Though the odds were not in his favor, they never really had been in any previous battles, and he was confident in his men, and at the ineptitude of McClellan and the various other generals that his forces would win, but he still preferred a more even fight. Despite such things, he set up his men as best he could. He sent General Hood and his division to the north of the town, next to Dunker or Dunkards Church, which was surrounded by the three wood plots known as the East, West, and North Woods. Lee also sent D.H. Hill's Division to the right of the Piper Farm, while D.R. Jones' Division was set up to the south of the Boonsboro Pike on a set of heights with a good command of the area. To guard the Lower Bridge, Lee gave hope to General Toombs and his small brigade of Georgians, while two wings of JEB Stuart's cavalry guarded the far south and a position northeast of Hood and his men, near a bend in the Potomac River.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map4.jpg
During the wee morning hours of the 15th, Jackson and his 15,000 men were marching with all haste to Sharpsburg, leaving some 3,000 men with A.P. Hill at Harper's Ferry to parole the prisoners and collect the various spoils. However, it would take a full day before they could reach Lee. McClellan and the majority of his men reached the eastern side of Antietam Creek by the afternoon of the 15th, but "Little Napoleon" decided that it was too late in the day to make any attempt on Lee, who he believed to be in full retreat back to Virginia in any case. So, while the men were able to see some enemy movement on the other side of the creek, they were instead set to setting up camp in assigned positions, creating some battery positions, and waiting for more men to come from South Mountain. Some of this can be seen in another telegram sent by McClellan to Washington on the morning of the 16th:
"This morning a heavy fog has thus far prevented our doing more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there. Do not yet know in what force.
Will attack as soon as situation of the enemy is developed."2
As McClellan did his extensive amount of preparations, Jackson and two of his divisions arrived, and joined up with his third division under D.H. Hill on the left flank, bringing the numbers up significantly to around 40,000 men, and another division under Walker arrived and remained to the south of the town. Getting back to McClellan however, he set up his extensive forces in several groups on the east side of the Antietam Creek in the afternoon of the 15th. For his headquarters, he set up a post a mile to the south of Keedysville on Boonsboro Pike. The cavalry of Brigadier General Pleasanton's division under the XII Corps was sent to the Upper Bridge to set up positions on some heights to the east side. The divisions of Richardson and Sykes were sent to guard the Middle Bridge, while the entirety of Hooker's I Corps were halted at the Upper Bridge as well. Sumner and his II Corps, along with rest of XII Corps and the divisions of French and Sedgewick were stopped at Keedysville for the night. When Cox and his IX Corps arrived later in the evening of the 15th, they were put under the command of Burnside, and then placed next to the Lower Bridge.
Throughout the whole morning of the 16th, McClellan continued to dally by riding up and down the lines, looking for fords, clearing approaches, and working on bringing up more ammo and supplies. At around noon, another division under Morrell of the V Corps arrived along with the commander, Major General Porter. They were also sent to be reserves at Keedysville.
Finally, at 2:30 PM, the Army of the Potomac began to move, starting with Hooker and his I Corps of some 8,500 men, which was sent over the Upper Bridge to attack Lee's left flank. Hooker was under the impression however that his Corps alone would be making the attack against the entire Confederate Army, even if it was in full retreat (which it wasn't).
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map5.jpg
He sent word to McClellan that if he did not receive some form of reinforcement, or that if another attack was not made in conjunction, that he would have no chance and would be destroyed. In response, Sumner's XII Corps under Mansfield was sent to him from Keedysville, and at the same time McClellan decided to move his headquarters to Phillip Pry's house to the west of Boonsboro Pike so as to be closer to the front.
When Hooker crossed the upper bridge, Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet were meeting in the center of Sharpsburg. A courier came up to tell them the news along with reports of enemy movement at the Lower Bridge. Lee immediately sent Jackson with J.R. Jones' command to back up Hood at Dunker Church. Lawton's Brigade of Ewell's Division was initially sent to support Toombs and his defense of the Lower Bridge, but when no continued movement was seen, he was sent up to Jackson to help support the left. Walker and his command from Harper's Ferry were still waiting to the south, and could back up Toombs at any point.
In the early evening of the 16th, Hooker's column of the I Corps neared the East Woods, with skirmishers from Meade's 3rd Division guarding the front. They came in contact with men from Hood's Division, and a lively skirmish ensued, prematurely ended by the onset of darkness and a light downpour of rain. The rebel division of Hood retreated to the West Woods, while Hooker and the I Corps set up a bivouac east of Hagerstown Pike and north of the Joseph Poffenburger farm. Hooker sent word to McClellan that he would continue his attack at dawn, but was still desperate for the promised reinforcements, especially if they could come beforehand. McClellan sent word to Franklin still at South Mountain to also join the fight at Sharpsburg, with the exception of Couch's 3rd Division. At the same time, Mansfield and the XII Corps crossed the Upper Bridge around midnight, and set up their own bivouac with Hooker's I Corps by 2:00 AM of the 17th, two miles north of the East Woods.
Lee, in the meantime, sent a courier to A.P. Hill in Harper's Ferry to get to Sharpsburg as quickly as possible, while leaving a small force behind to finish up what was left with the paroling.
Finally, the Battle
The rain still fell prior to when the morning light came into the valley on the 17th. Hooker's men awoke to this drizzle and the sound of the pickets of Hooker and Jackson firing on each other. Fighting began in more earnest as the rain ceased around 6 AM, though a low-lying mist still clung close to the ground.
Hooker planned to advance his lines a mile in front of his position onto the high ground that today comprises the visitor's center. Doubleday and his division marched south directly down Hagerstown Pike, while Ricketts and his division moved obliquely south to the west of Smoketown Road. Two brigades of Meade's men stayed back in the North Woods as reserves, while another brigade was in the East Woods as an advanced position to the right of the Confederate lines. Additionally, Hooker had set up artillery behind his lines near the Joseph Poffenberger farm, and McClellan had long range artillery to the east of Antietam Creek. These artillery pieces enfiladed Jackson's lines while the Union men marched towards them.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map6.jpg
Despite the heavy shelling, the random shell fragment rending limbs and disemboweling men at random, still the Confederate men held. J.R. Jones' Division was west of Hagerstown's Pike and 500 yards north of Dunker Church, sitting in the West Woods. Jubal Early's Brigade sat farther west, supporting both Stuart's cavalry wing and Pelham's 14 pieces of artillery which were in perfect position on Nicodemus Hill to enfilade the Union lines in turn. Lawton and the remainder of his division had extended a line on the southern edge of what would soon be the infamous Cornfield. Finally, another part of Lawton's Division were placed to the left of Samuel Mumma's Farm. Pelham opened up his batteries on Gibbon's 4th Brigade as they marched on Hagerstown's Pike. One of Hood's artillery battalions under command by Stephen D. Lee were placed on a knoll next to Dunker Church and also fired on Doubleday's men as they marched into the sound of an "unbroken roll of a thunder-storm."3
Both of the divisions of Doubleday and Ricketts reached Jackson's lines in good time, reaching the Miller farm. Hooker could see a great many poking bayonets above the six-feet high cornfield, and brought forward two batteries of artillery, having them load canister and rake the fields again and again. From the eyes of one who took part in it:
“To the Texans in the ranks the sound of battle was deafening: the boom of artillery; the loud reports of dozens of nearby rifles and the steady
popping of thousands more distant; the explosions of shells and the whine and hiss of lead balls and steel fragments. Men whooped and
yelled; others screamed to be heard by their comrades. File closers and company commanders bellowed orders and encouragement until they
were hoarse-or shot. Dead and dangerously wounded Texans lay among the living and unhurt. Walking wounded dribbled from the line. Like a
funeral pall, thick clouds of smoke drifted over the corn and at times obscured the sun.”4
Ricketts advanced his men forward into the cornfield, or what was left of it. However, only one of the three brigades went all the way to engage with the Confederate lines when one commander was shot, and another lost his nerve and pulled his brigade back. The last brigade stood no long-standing chance against the whole of Lawton's division, and was sent back with heavy losses. The other two brigades had new commanders installed, and also went up against Lawton, but they were very uncoordinated, and ended up being beaten back by turn.
All these events took place in the eastern portion of the battlefield, Doubleday and his division fought in the western portion. While the left of Lawton's line was sent back, J.R. Jones' Division partially came up but was likewise crushed. With all these casualties, Lawton decided to fall back on J.R. Jones' line. An hour after the pickets first began to fire, over half of Jackson's command was dead or seriously wounded, but the Yankees had the cornfield.
J.R. Jones was carted off the field after having been stunned by an artillery shell, and Brigadier General William Starke - commander of the third brigade in Jones' Division - was killed.
Hood's Attack
Jackson had extracted a promise from Hood when he retreated back the previous night from the North Woods that he would come back when called. Jackson called on that promise now, when Hood's men were still trying to eat breakfast. Leaving the eggs and salt pork on the fire, the men formed and headed north towards the scene of battle. Col. William Wofford and his brigade held the left, while Col. Evander Law's brigade formed the right for Hood. Doubleday and his men had reformed and begun to continue the advance meant to be done by Hooker, but were surprised by Hood's men. The Confederates burst from the woods around Dunker Church and set onto the Union men with a yell and a volley of fire.
Doubleday's men fell back through the bloodied Cornfield and rallied above the west woods on the right of Meade's 3rd Division, who had arrived recently at the Miller farm. The left of Hood's Division came under fire from Doubleday's men, as well as Battery B of the 4th US Artillery firing canister rounds from only 25 yards away. The canister rounds were filled with many small Minie Balls and shrapnel, along with shredded fence posts drove right into Wofford's men. Survivors immediately began to shoot at the cannoneers.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map7.jpg
While the left lines were busy, the 1st Texas Infantry moved up through the center of Hood's lines and through the cornfield, but met with two brigades of Meade's men. The mismatch left the 1st Texas with 80% casualties, before they retreated back through the Cornfield. In the meantime, the right side of Hood's line also entered the fray, this time in the East Woods. Mansfield had arrived with the XII Corps, but he believed that it was Hooker's men in front of him, not Hood's, and so rode in front of the line to stop his men from firing, but was mortally wounded. He was replaced by Brigadier General Alpheus Williams, and did advance into the field, sending all of Hood's Division back into the West Woods. Williams and his division stopped in the Cornfield, and the other division commander of the XII Corps - Brigadier General George S. Greene - detached one of his brigades to help support Williams, while he and his other two brigades moved to the artillery of S. D. Lee, sending them on the retreat. They stopped on the plateau to the east of Dunker Church.
Hooker received a wound in the foot at this time, and he turned over command of the I Corps to Meade, who believed that the XII Corps was there to relieve them, and so pulled out the I Corps to the North Woods.
Continue to Part 2 (http://warofrights.com/forum/showthread.php?237-The-Maryland-Campaign-The-Battle-of-Antietam-Pt-2&p=3778#post3778)
1The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1887. Printed. pg. 281.
2Ibid. pp. 307-08.
3Coffin, Charles C. "Antietam Scenes." Century Magazine June 1886: 315-19. Web. 23 June 2014. <http://www.unz.org/Pub/Century-1886jun-
00315>.
4Otott, George E. "First Texas in the Cornfield." The Maryland Campaign of 1862 Civil War Regiments: A Journal of the American Civil War. 3rd ed.
Vol. 5. Campbell, CA: Savas, 1998. N. pag. Print.
Antietam
The defeat of the Confederates at South Mountain was not a complete loss, as tactically speaking it did allow Lee and his forces time to congregate together again at Sharpsburg, a town only remarkable in the fact that it was a general central point between the various parts of the Rebel army.
As the Battles at South Mountain raged, Jackson finished up his capture of Harper's Ferry and its vast store of weapons and cannon, on top of the 15,700 Union soldiers captured. As soon as he received the order from Lee to return with all haste to Sharpsburg, he spared no time in doing so, leaving General Hill and his division to finish the parole of their new prisoners.
At South Mountain itself, the inactivity of McClellan as night fell allowed the Confederates to retreat during the evening hours, and go un-hounded all the way to Sharpsburg. General Franklin and his wing were supposed to follow through his taking of Crampton's Gap with advancing towards Harper's Ferry so as to lift the siege. But Franklin was overly cautious and was convinced that a large force was ready to pounce on him in the valley were he to go through the gap, when in reality the Confederate general McLaws had already left to also rejoin Lee.
All the gained time so freely given by Federal forces allowed the ANV to set up some defenses and set their cannons up in the best positions possible around the town of Sharpsburg and the nearby creek called Antietam. At this point, the only thing greatly worrying Lee's mind was the other half of the army under Jackson still on the way from Harper's Weekly.
McClellan, for his part, was very confident in the situation, even to the point that he felt he had Lee in a corner and bound to face total destruction, as this telegram back to the capital stated:
HEADQUARTERS, Frederick, September 13, 1862–12 m.
(Received 2.35 a. m., September 14.)
To the PRESIDENT:
I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, and no time shall be lost... I think Lee has made a gross mistake, and that he will be
severely punished for it. The army is in motion as rapidly as possible. I hope for a great success if the plans of the rebels remain
unchanged... I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency. I now feel that I
can count on them as of old... Received most enthusiastically by the ladies. Will send you trophies....
GEO. B. McCLELLAN.1
However, even in this confidence, McClellan's follow-through left something to be desired. When Confederate troops left the area of South Mountain, McClellan and the majority of his force followed them through the Fox and Turner Gaps at dawn on the 15th. Franklin and his men at Crampton's Gap remained in the valley which Franklin was hesitant to go into previously, for fear of a Confederate ambush.
During this time, Lee had gathered his men around the town of Sharpsburg, if rather frantically, as his force of 25,000 odd men could not withstand for long against a force of around 80,000. Though the odds were not in his favor, they never really had been in any previous battles, and he was confident in his men, and at the ineptitude of McClellan and the various other generals that his forces would win, but he still preferred a more even fight. Despite such things, he set up his men as best he could. He sent General Hood and his division to the north of the town, next to Dunker or Dunkards Church, which was surrounded by the three wood plots known as the East, West, and North Woods. Lee also sent D.H. Hill's Division to the right of the Piper Farm, while D.R. Jones' Division was set up to the south of the Boonsboro Pike on a set of heights with a good command of the area. To guard the Lower Bridge, Lee gave hope to General Toombs and his small brigade of Georgians, while two wings of JEB Stuart's cavalry guarded the far south and a position northeast of Hood and his men, near a bend in the Potomac River.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map4.jpg
During the wee morning hours of the 15th, Jackson and his 15,000 men were marching with all haste to Sharpsburg, leaving some 3,000 men with A.P. Hill at Harper's Ferry to parole the prisoners and collect the various spoils. However, it would take a full day before they could reach Lee. McClellan and the majority of his men reached the eastern side of Antietam Creek by the afternoon of the 15th, but "Little Napoleon" decided that it was too late in the day to make any attempt on Lee, who he believed to be in full retreat back to Virginia in any case. So, while the men were able to see some enemy movement on the other side of the creek, they were instead set to setting up camp in assigned positions, creating some battery positions, and waiting for more men to come from South Mountain. Some of this can be seen in another telegram sent by McClellan to Washington on the morning of the 16th:
"This morning a heavy fog has thus far prevented our doing more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there. Do not yet know in what force.
Will attack as soon as situation of the enemy is developed."2
As McClellan did his extensive amount of preparations, Jackson and two of his divisions arrived, and joined up with his third division under D.H. Hill on the left flank, bringing the numbers up significantly to around 40,000 men, and another division under Walker arrived and remained to the south of the town. Getting back to McClellan however, he set up his extensive forces in several groups on the east side of the Antietam Creek in the afternoon of the 15th. For his headquarters, he set up a post a mile to the south of Keedysville on Boonsboro Pike. The cavalry of Brigadier General Pleasanton's division under the XII Corps was sent to the Upper Bridge to set up positions on some heights to the east side. The divisions of Richardson and Sykes were sent to guard the Middle Bridge, while the entirety of Hooker's I Corps were halted at the Upper Bridge as well. Sumner and his II Corps, along with rest of XII Corps and the divisions of French and Sedgewick were stopped at Keedysville for the night. When Cox and his IX Corps arrived later in the evening of the 15th, they were put under the command of Burnside, and then placed next to the Lower Bridge.
Throughout the whole morning of the 16th, McClellan continued to dally by riding up and down the lines, looking for fords, clearing approaches, and working on bringing up more ammo and supplies. At around noon, another division under Morrell of the V Corps arrived along with the commander, Major General Porter. They were also sent to be reserves at Keedysville.
Finally, at 2:30 PM, the Army of the Potomac began to move, starting with Hooker and his I Corps of some 8,500 men, which was sent over the Upper Bridge to attack Lee's left flank. Hooker was under the impression however that his Corps alone would be making the attack against the entire Confederate Army, even if it was in full retreat (which it wasn't).
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map5.jpg
He sent word to McClellan that if he did not receive some form of reinforcement, or that if another attack was not made in conjunction, that he would have no chance and would be destroyed. In response, Sumner's XII Corps under Mansfield was sent to him from Keedysville, and at the same time McClellan decided to move his headquarters to Phillip Pry's house to the west of Boonsboro Pike so as to be closer to the front.
When Hooker crossed the upper bridge, Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet were meeting in the center of Sharpsburg. A courier came up to tell them the news along with reports of enemy movement at the Lower Bridge. Lee immediately sent Jackson with J.R. Jones' command to back up Hood at Dunker Church. Lawton's Brigade of Ewell's Division was initially sent to support Toombs and his defense of the Lower Bridge, but when no continued movement was seen, he was sent up to Jackson to help support the left. Walker and his command from Harper's Ferry were still waiting to the south, and could back up Toombs at any point.
In the early evening of the 16th, Hooker's column of the I Corps neared the East Woods, with skirmishers from Meade's 3rd Division guarding the front. They came in contact with men from Hood's Division, and a lively skirmish ensued, prematurely ended by the onset of darkness and a light downpour of rain. The rebel division of Hood retreated to the West Woods, while Hooker and the I Corps set up a bivouac east of Hagerstown Pike and north of the Joseph Poffenburger farm. Hooker sent word to McClellan that he would continue his attack at dawn, but was still desperate for the promised reinforcements, especially if they could come beforehand. McClellan sent word to Franklin still at South Mountain to also join the fight at Sharpsburg, with the exception of Couch's 3rd Division. At the same time, Mansfield and the XII Corps crossed the Upper Bridge around midnight, and set up their own bivouac with Hooker's I Corps by 2:00 AM of the 17th, two miles north of the East Woods.
Lee, in the meantime, sent a courier to A.P. Hill in Harper's Ferry to get to Sharpsburg as quickly as possible, while leaving a small force behind to finish up what was left with the paroling.
Finally, the Battle
The rain still fell prior to when the morning light came into the valley on the 17th. Hooker's men awoke to this drizzle and the sound of the pickets of Hooker and Jackson firing on each other. Fighting began in more earnest as the rain ceased around 6 AM, though a low-lying mist still clung close to the ground.
Hooker planned to advance his lines a mile in front of his position onto the high ground that today comprises the visitor's center. Doubleday and his division marched south directly down Hagerstown Pike, while Ricketts and his division moved obliquely south to the west of Smoketown Road. Two brigades of Meade's men stayed back in the North Woods as reserves, while another brigade was in the East Woods as an advanced position to the right of the Confederate lines. Additionally, Hooker had set up artillery behind his lines near the Joseph Poffenberger farm, and McClellan had long range artillery to the east of Antietam Creek. These artillery pieces enfiladed Jackson's lines while the Union men marched towards them.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map6.jpg
Despite the heavy shelling, the random shell fragment rending limbs and disemboweling men at random, still the Confederate men held. J.R. Jones' Division was west of Hagerstown's Pike and 500 yards north of Dunker Church, sitting in the West Woods. Jubal Early's Brigade sat farther west, supporting both Stuart's cavalry wing and Pelham's 14 pieces of artillery which were in perfect position on Nicodemus Hill to enfilade the Union lines in turn. Lawton and the remainder of his division had extended a line on the southern edge of what would soon be the infamous Cornfield. Finally, another part of Lawton's Division were placed to the left of Samuel Mumma's Farm. Pelham opened up his batteries on Gibbon's 4th Brigade as they marched on Hagerstown's Pike. One of Hood's artillery battalions under command by Stephen D. Lee were placed on a knoll next to Dunker Church and also fired on Doubleday's men as they marched into the sound of an "unbroken roll of a thunder-storm."3
Both of the divisions of Doubleday and Ricketts reached Jackson's lines in good time, reaching the Miller farm. Hooker could see a great many poking bayonets above the six-feet high cornfield, and brought forward two batteries of artillery, having them load canister and rake the fields again and again. From the eyes of one who took part in it:
“To the Texans in the ranks the sound of battle was deafening: the boom of artillery; the loud reports of dozens of nearby rifles and the steady
popping of thousands more distant; the explosions of shells and the whine and hiss of lead balls and steel fragments. Men whooped and
yelled; others screamed to be heard by their comrades. File closers and company commanders bellowed orders and encouragement until they
were hoarse-or shot. Dead and dangerously wounded Texans lay among the living and unhurt. Walking wounded dribbled from the line. Like a
funeral pall, thick clouds of smoke drifted over the corn and at times obscured the sun.”4
Ricketts advanced his men forward into the cornfield, or what was left of it. However, only one of the three brigades went all the way to engage with the Confederate lines when one commander was shot, and another lost his nerve and pulled his brigade back. The last brigade stood no long-standing chance against the whole of Lawton's division, and was sent back with heavy losses. The other two brigades had new commanders installed, and also went up against Lawton, but they were very uncoordinated, and ended up being beaten back by turn.
All these events took place in the eastern portion of the battlefield, Doubleday and his division fought in the western portion. While the left of Lawton's line was sent back, J.R. Jones' Division partially came up but was likewise crushed. With all these casualties, Lawton decided to fall back on J.R. Jones' line. An hour after the pickets first began to fire, over half of Jackson's command was dead or seriously wounded, but the Yankees had the cornfield.
J.R. Jones was carted off the field after having been stunned by an artillery shell, and Brigadier General William Starke - commander of the third brigade in Jones' Division - was killed.
Hood's Attack
Jackson had extracted a promise from Hood when he retreated back the previous night from the North Woods that he would come back when called. Jackson called on that promise now, when Hood's men were still trying to eat breakfast. Leaving the eggs and salt pork on the fire, the men formed and headed north towards the scene of battle. Col. William Wofford and his brigade held the left, while Col. Evander Law's brigade formed the right for Hood. Doubleday and his men had reformed and begun to continue the advance meant to be done by Hooker, but were surprised by Hood's men. The Confederates burst from the woods around Dunker Church and set onto the Union men with a yell and a volley of fire.
Doubleday's men fell back through the bloodied Cornfield and rallied above the west woods on the right of Meade's 3rd Division, who had arrived recently at the Miller farm. The left of Hood's Division came under fire from Doubleday's men, as well as Battery B of the 4th US Artillery firing canister rounds from only 25 yards away. The canister rounds were filled with many small Minie Balls and shrapnel, along with shredded fence posts drove right into Wofford's men. Survivors immediately began to shoot at the cannoneers.
http://www.history.army.mil/StaffRide/Antietam/Images/Map7.jpg
While the left lines were busy, the 1st Texas Infantry moved up through the center of Hood's lines and through the cornfield, but met with two brigades of Meade's men. The mismatch left the 1st Texas with 80% casualties, before they retreated back through the Cornfield. In the meantime, the right side of Hood's line also entered the fray, this time in the East Woods. Mansfield had arrived with the XII Corps, but he believed that it was Hooker's men in front of him, not Hood's, and so rode in front of the line to stop his men from firing, but was mortally wounded. He was replaced by Brigadier General Alpheus Williams, and did advance into the field, sending all of Hood's Division back into the West Woods. Williams and his division stopped in the Cornfield, and the other division commander of the XII Corps - Brigadier General George S. Greene - detached one of his brigades to help support Williams, while he and his other two brigades moved to the artillery of S. D. Lee, sending them on the retreat. They stopped on the plateau to the east of Dunker Church.
Hooker received a wound in the foot at this time, and he turned over command of the I Corps to Meade, who believed that the XII Corps was there to relieve them, and so pulled out the I Corps to the North Woods.
Continue to Part 2 (http://warofrights.com/forum/showthread.php?237-The-Maryland-Campaign-The-Battle-of-Antietam-Pt-2&p=3778#post3778)
1The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1887. Printed. pg. 281.
2Ibid. pp. 307-08.
3Coffin, Charles C. "Antietam Scenes." Century Magazine June 1886: 315-19. Web. 23 June 2014. <http://www.unz.org/Pub/Century-1886jun-
00315>.
4Otott, George E. "First Texas in the Cornfield." The Maryland Campaign of 1862 Civil War Regiments: A Journal of the American Civil War. 3rd ed.
Vol. 5. Campbell, CA: Savas, 1998. N. pag. Print.