GeorgeCrecy
11-17-2014, 12:51 AM
Hello one and all,
I thought I would celebrate the anniversary of the infamous Trent Affair, which almost brought Great Britain into the war, by doing this "little" piece on it.
Within the first few months of the engagement, the Confederacy knew that one of the most important ways to win the war was to get recognized as an independent nation by the European nations, rather than be only thought of as a few rebelling states. The hoped-for effect wasn't exactly for the European powers to join in the fighting, so much as to get them to force a peace and act as mediators in the peace talks that would result.
As for the Union position, any European involvement in the war was to be avoided at all cost were the nation to be reunited. Secretary of State William Seward followed the principles set down by the forefathers, that of US neutrality in all foreign affairs and the prevention of any foreign influence on anything going on in the western hemisphere.
Fortunately for Seward and the Union, the main concern was the power wielded by Britain. The British Prime Minister of the time, Lord Palmerston, had his own problems to attend to, and at the time was content to also urge for a neutral western policy. Napoleon III of France was beginning to look at his neighbors as potential new real estate. Additionally, the future "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismark was quickly rising through the political ranks of Prussia, and was engineering the unification of the German states into one powerful German empire. During the 1840's, the US relations with Britain had improved greatly between the affairs of the Oregon territory, Texas involvement, and stamping out the proper US/Canadian borders all being resolved. With these in mind, Britain was cautious to come to Rebel aid over the Union. Meanwhile, Confederate diplomats urged for Britain to use it's powerful navy to stop the blockade of Southern ports, but in the past the English had long held that neutral nations should not interfere in the blockades made in other's wars. So, rather than be hypocritical, they did not stop the blockading, much to the frustration of the Southerners. Finally, Lord Lyons, the British Minister to the US, was also a calming influence for the coming political storm that aided the non-involvement of Britain.
However, events begin in February of 1861, when three delegates from the South by the names of William Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Mann went to Britain with the instruction to open diplomatic avenues, and to see if they were willing to trade and declare any possible involvement in the war. One of the chief cards that they were looking to use was the British dependence on southern cotton. Without it, the enormous textile industry of the island nation would stagnate. They met with Foreign Secretary Lord Russell on May 3rd, just as news of the bombardment and taking of Fort Sumter reached them.
Russell was very vague however at the end of the talks, only promising to speak about it at the next meeting of the cabinet. However, after Russell met with Queen Victoria, she proclaimed the neutrality of England to the war going on between the US and the rebels. While this might seem to be a bad thing for the Confederates, it was a brilliant diplomatic coup which did recognize that a war was going on in the first place instead of the Civil War being a small internal strife. This allowed Confederate ships the same rights in international waters and British ports as any nation's ships. Spain, France, Brazil, and the Netherlands all proclaimed the same shortly after.
Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams and the US diplomat in London, met with Lord Russell to argue against the neutral proclamation. Russell acknowledged the fear of the US that with this statement of neutrality, the next step might constitute recognition. He did promise that while it wasn't being considered at the time, that he would be sure to let him know should it come to the table.
In the meantime, the French were also being targeted by Confederate dignitaries to seek recognition and/or involvement. However, the French Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel was largely pro-Union, and he cautioned Napoleon III from his intentions to recognize the south, and even went so far as to say in an unofficial meeting with the Confederate envoy Pierre Rost that he should not expect any sort of recognition.
With all these nails in the coffin of the Rebellion's cause, still some cracks allowed sunshine through. Popular British opinion was that a split between the North and South was unstoppable. The success in the First Battle of Bull Run only reinforced this position. Confederate delegates in the various foreign nations used it as best they could to again argue their position. In Britain, Russell replied to a letter from the delegate Yancey on August 24th in saying that the "so-styled Confederate States of America" was no more than an internal matter, rather than a war for independence. This was the last communication between the two parties, and when the Trent Affair sprang up, the Confederate delegates had no way to be part of the negotiations that followed.
That same August of 1861, President Davis sought for some better diplomats to represent the Confederacy in Britain and France. He and the new Secretary of State Robert Hunter chose John Slidell and James Mason. Unfortunately, the new diplomats and their mission were no secret to the Northern government. They knew when Slidell and Mason arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, where they intended to go directly to Britain aboard the CSS Nashville. However, five large Union warships were guarding their exit. The Nashville's draft being two deep to go around them via one of the side channels, they thought of leaving via Mexico, but the months of travel was considered to be too much considering the situation. Instead, another opportunity presented itself. The steamer Gordon was fast and shallow, able to get out of the channel and outrun any Union ships. It was offered for use by the government for a purchase of $62,000, or to be chartered for $10,000. They were unable to pay, but a cottage broker by the name of George Trenholm was willing to pay it were half of the cargo space was made available to him for the return trip. An agreement was hammered out and the ship, renamed Theodora, left the port at one AM on October 12th.
Successfully maneuvering around the Union ships, it reached Nassau by the 14th. While they missed their connecting British ship, they were instead directed to go to Spanish Cuba to try for one of the British mail ships. Arriving on the 15th at Cardenas, Cuba, the two diplomats disembarked and endeavored to make the overland trip to Havana in the three weeks they had to wait for the HMS Trent which was due to arrive.
US intelligence in the meantime was in a flurry at the escape of the two diplomats, believing they had left on the CSS Nashville. The USS James Adger was immediately dispatched to capture the Nashville even were it in the English Channel. It docked at Southhampton in early November, and in reaction the British sent a warship of it's own to patrol a few miles outside the expected destination to make sure any such capture would occur outside of British waters, so as to avoid any diplomatic repercussions. When the Nashville did arrive on November 21st, it was to the great surprise of everyone that no Confederate delegates were on board.
The US frigate called the San Jacinto arrived in St. Thomas on October 13th, under the orders to join an attack against Port Royal, SC, but while there Captain Charles Wilkes heard of the capturing of three Union merchantmen off of Cienfuegos earlier that July by the CSS Sumter. Heading that way despite how incredibly unlikely the Sumter was still in the area, he arrived at Cienfuegos. At the harbor, he chanced to look at a newspaper, and saw that the two diplomats Slidell and Mason were due to board the HMS Trent on November 7th from Havana on route to Britain. Realizing the implications, Captain Wilkes quickly met with his second in command, Lieutenant Fairfax, and after much discussion came to the conclusion that the two diplomats could be considered contraband and able to be seized by them.
They made way for what the Captain considered to be the route the Trent would take, the Bahama Channel. Indeed, the Trent left on schedule from Havana with Mason and Slidell, as well as their secretaries, Slidell's wife and three children. By noon of November 8th, lookouts atop the masts of the San Jacinto espied the Trent steaming toward them. The San Jacinto fired a warning shot across the other's bow, which Captain James Moir chose to ignore, though the second shot from a front pivot gun which landed right in front of the Trent did cause him to quickly give orders to stop. Captain Wilkes aboard his frigate gave Lieutenant Fairfax the following orders:
"On boarding her you will demand the papers of the steamer, her clearance from Havana, with the list of passengers and crew.
Should Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustice [sic] and Mr. McFarland be on board make them prisoners and send them on board this ship and take possession of [the Trent] as a prize.… They must be brought on board.
All trunks, cases, packages and bags belonging to them you will take possession of and send on board this ship; any dispatches found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession of those on board the steamer, will be taken possession of, examined, and retained if necessary." 1
Fortunately for both sides, Lieutenant Fairfax was much more level headed than Captain Wilkes, who while being known as a brave and courageous man, was also known to be quickly angered, impulsive, and overzealous. He ordered the armed men aboard the two cutters sent over to the Trent to remain in their boats while he boarded the ship. He was immediately met by an irate Captain Moir, whom he showed his orders to. Sputtering with rage, Moir immediately refused the request for the passenger list, as he and the other crew and passengers made bodily threats to Fairfax's person. The armed men aboard the cutters heard this, and boarded the Trent to protect him. However, as matters escalated, Mason and Slidell came forward and declared their names. Captain Moir also refused to let the Yanks search his cargo, and Fairfax declined to force the issue, as he knew this would become an international incident, and wished to minimize it as much as possible. While Mason and Slidell refused to voluntarily be captured, they put up no resistance when the San Jacinto crew manhandled them onto the cutters. The secretaries were also taken, but Fairfax refused to take the Trent as a prize, arguing to Wilkes once he was back aboard the frigate that it would leave the San Jacinto dangerously undermanned. Wilkes agreed, and the Trent was allowed to continue on it's route to England.
The San Jacinto made for Hampton Roads, VA, arriving on November 15th. Wilkes sent a telegram to Washington to inform them of the capture, and was wired back orders to proceed to Boston, where the two men would be put into Fort Warren, the POW prison there.
News hit the presses by the 16th, and by the 18th all the public in the North was focused on it. Many of the newspapers were making legal arguments supporting their capture, and many lawyers came forward to similarly support Captain Wilkes' actions. The exultation across the North was more temperate in the Government, which had to deal with the repercussions. The British first learned of what happened on November 27th, and their reaction got back to America on December 15th. The Prime Minister had furiously demanded that the prisoners be released and that an official apology be given. Congress debated what was to be done and sent the matter to committee, which awaited the official British response to arrive by December 18th.
Previous to the affair being known, the matter of what would happen had been debated in Britain as well, and the official statement of the Law Officers of the Crown was that:
"The United States' man-of-war falling in with the British mail steamer [this was the example used in the hypothetical submitted by the cabinet] beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom might cause her to bring-to, might board her, examine her papers, open the general mail bags, and examine the contents thereof, without, however opening any mail bag or packet addressed to any officer or Department of Her Majesty's Government.
The United States' ship of war may put a prize-crew on board the West India steamer, and carry her off to a port of the United States for adjudication by a Prize Court there; but she would have no right to move Messrs. Mason and Slidell, and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage." 2
The same day the above was released, Prime Minister Palmerston personally met with US diplomat Adams to say that a few more Confederates in England still would not change their position, and Adams replied to assure that the orders of Commander Marchand aboard the USS James Adger was to seize them were they on a Confederate ship. When news reached London on November 27th, the public was outraged at the slight to British honor, and viewed the seizure as a direct and obvious violation of maritime law. The London Chronicle wrote shortly after:
"Mr. Seward … is exerting himself to provoke a quarrel with all Europe, in that spirit of senseless egotism which induces the Americans, with their dwarf fleet and shapeless mass of incoherent squads which they call an army, to fancy themselves the equal of France by land and Great Britain by sea." 3
Fortunately, after the initial response, the British press refrained to a more moderate stance that advocated that people stay calm and not perceive the actions in only the worst way. The Law Offices of the Crown were again called on for an official statement, to which they said that while international law was not breached as per the boarding of the Trent since it was not taken as a prize, the taking of the two diplomats was a breach that required reparations. Queen Victoria was given the draft of the dispatch to be sent to Lord Lyons, but she had Prince Albert take a look at them. Lying in bed at the time in the last throes of his fight with typhoid, Albert did look at them and saw them as too belligerent. He drafted a softened version, which was included in the official statement sent to Lyons on November 30th, which while it disavowed any possible Union intent to dishonor the British flag, did still request an apology and immediate release of the two diplomats.
Preparations began to be made by Britain to guard against a possible invasion by Union forces into Canada. By mid-December, 18 transport ships had shipped over troops that reinforced the 5,000 regular troops to be more along the lines of 18,000, along with the twelve batteries of artillery, with plans to increase this to be 110,000. However, plans were put aside once news of the resolution reached Canadian military headquarters in late December.
On December 27th, the US released it's official response, which focused primarily on that the prisoners would be released, though no official apology was given as asked. Indeed, Mason and Slidell were released from Fort Warren and boarded the HMS Rinaldo in Provincetown, MA. The American public, then less jubilant and more tempered by the implications of the incident, were generally supportive of their release. A few people, such as Captain Wilkes, viewed it as ""as a craven yielding and an abandonment of all the good … done by [their] capture." 4 News reached Britain on January 8th, and was viewed as a great victory for the honor of the nation and the upholding of maritime law.
The crisis was officially over. Britain and France both secretly considered extending formal recognition or suggesting mediation for the sake of humanitarianism, which was intensified when news of the carnage that was the Battle of Shiloh reached European shores. However, it was the release of the Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that made the war more about slavery than a issue of states rights. By November of 1862, European opinion had turned to supporting the Union.
That was a long read, and I appreciate you sticking in for it all.
1. Fairfax, Douglas M. "Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell." Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam. Ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarencce C. Buel. N.p.: n.p., 1885. 136-37. Print.
2. James P. Baxter, III. "Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865." The American Historical Review 34.1 (1928): 77-91. JSTOR. Web. 16 Nov. 2014. Link (http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1836481?ref=no-x-route:4e48b4b08c0b626c76d52a25d34f1e29).
3. Donald, David Herbert, Jean H. Baker, and Michael F. Holt. The Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: Norton, 2001. 315. Print.
4. Ferris, Norman B. The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis. Knoxville: U of Tennessee, 1977. 188-91. Print.
I thought I would celebrate the anniversary of the infamous Trent Affair, which almost brought Great Britain into the war, by doing this "little" piece on it.
Within the first few months of the engagement, the Confederacy knew that one of the most important ways to win the war was to get recognized as an independent nation by the European nations, rather than be only thought of as a few rebelling states. The hoped-for effect wasn't exactly for the European powers to join in the fighting, so much as to get them to force a peace and act as mediators in the peace talks that would result.
As for the Union position, any European involvement in the war was to be avoided at all cost were the nation to be reunited. Secretary of State William Seward followed the principles set down by the forefathers, that of US neutrality in all foreign affairs and the prevention of any foreign influence on anything going on in the western hemisphere.
Fortunately for Seward and the Union, the main concern was the power wielded by Britain. The British Prime Minister of the time, Lord Palmerston, had his own problems to attend to, and at the time was content to also urge for a neutral western policy. Napoleon III of France was beginning to look at his neighbors as potential new real estate. Additionally, the future "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismark was quickly rising through the political ranks of Prussia, and was engineering the unification of the German states into one powerful German empire. During the 1840's, the US relations with Britain had improved greatly between the affairs of the Oregon territory, Texas involvement, and stamping out the proper US/Canadian borders all being resolved. With these in mind, Britain was cautious to come to Rebel aid over the Union. Meanwhile, Confederate diplomats urged for Britain to use it's powerful navy to stop the blockade of Southern ports, but in the past the English had long held that neutral nations should not interfere in the blockades made in other's wars. So, rather than be hypocritical, they did not stop the blockading, much to the frustration of the Southerners. Finally, Lord Lyons, the British Minister to the US, was also a calming influence for the coming political storm that aided the non-involvement of Britain.
However, events begin in February of 1861, when three delegates from the South by the names of William Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Mann went to Britain with the instruction to open diplomatic avenues, and to see if they were willing to trade and declare any possible involvement in the war. One of the chief cards that they were looking to use was the British dependence on southern cotton. Without it, the enormous textile industry of the island nation would stagnate. They met with Foreign Secretary Lord Russell on May 3rd, just as news of the bombardment and taking of Fort Sumter reached them.
Russell was very vague however at the end of the talks, only promising to speak about it at the next meeting of the cabinet. However, after Russell met with Queen Victoria, she proclaimed the neutrality of England to the war going on between the US and the rebels. While this might seem to be a bad thing for the Confederates, it was a brilliant diplomatic coup which did recognize that a war was going on in the first place instead of the Civil War being a small internal strife. This allowed Confederate ships the same rights in international waters and British ports as any nation's ships. Spain, France, Brazil, and the Netherlands all proclaimed the same shortly after.
Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams and the US diplomat in London, met with Lord Russell to argue against the neutral proclamation. Russell acknowledged the fear of the US that with this statement of neutrality, the next step might constitute recognition. He did promise that while it wasn't being considered at the time, that he would be sure to let him know should it come to the table.
In the meantime, the French were also being targeted by Confederate dignitaries to seek recognition and/or involvement. However, the French Foreign Minister Edouard Thouvenel was largely pro-Union, and he cautioned Napoleon III from his intentions to recognize the south, and even went so far as to say in an unofficial meeting with the Confederate envoy Pierre Rost that he should not expect any sort of recognition.
With all these nails in the coffin of the Rebellion's cause, still some cracks allowed sunshine through. Popular British opinion was that a split between the North and South was unstoppable. The success in the First Battle of Bull Run only reinforced this position. Confederate delegates in the various foreign nations used it as best they could to again argue their position. In Britain, Russell replied to a letter from the delegate Yancey on August 24th in saying that the "so-styled Confederate States of America" was no more than an internal matter, rather than a war for independence. This was the last communication between the two parties, and when the Trent Affair sprang up, the Confederate delegates had no way to be part of the negotiations that followed.
That same August of 1861, President Davis sought for some better diplomats to represent the Confederacy in Britain and France. He and the new Secretary of State Robert Hunter chose John Slidell and James Mason. Unfortunately, the new diplomats and their mission were no secret to the Northern government. They knew when Slidell and Mason arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, where they intended to go directly to Britain aboard the CSS Nashville. However, five large Union warships were guarding their exit. The Nashville's draft being two deep to go around them via one of the side channels, they thought of leaving via Mexico, but the months of travel was considered to be too much considering the situation. Instead, another opportunity presented itself. The steamer Gordon was fast and shallow, able to get out of the channel and outrun any Union ships. It was offered for use by the government for a purchase of $62,000, or to be chartered for $10,000. They were unable to pay, but a cottage broker by the name of George Trenholm was willing to pay it were half of the cargo space was made available to him for the return trip. An agreement was hammered out and the ship, renamed Theodora, left the port at one AM on October 12th.
Successfully maneuvering around the Union ships, it reached Nassau by the 14th. While they missed their connecting British ship, they were instead directed to go to Spanish Cuba to try for one of the British mail ships. Arriving on the 15th at Cardenas, Cuba, the two diplomats disembarked and endeavored to make the overland trip to Havana in the three weeks they had to wait for the HMS Trent which was due to arrive.
US intelligence in the meantime was in a flurry at the escape of the two diplomats, believing they had left on the CSS Nashville. The USS James Adger was immediately dispatched to capture the Nashville even were it in the English Channel. It docked at Southhampton in early November, and in reaction the British sent a warship of it's own to patrol a few miles outside the expected destination to make sure any such capture would occur outside of British waters, so as to avoid any diplomatic repercussions. When the Nashville did arrive on November 21st, it was to the great surprise of everyone that no Confederate delegates were on board.
The US frigate called the San Jacinto arrived in St. Thomas on October 13th, under the orders to join an attack against Port Royal, SC, but while there Captain Charles Wilkes heard of the capturing of three Union merchantmen off of Cienfuegos earlier that July by the CSS Sumter. Heading that way despite how incredibly unlikely the Sumter was still in the area, he arrived at Cienfuegos. At the harbor, he chanced to look at a newspaper, and saw that the two diplomats Slidell and Mason were due to board the HMS Trent on November 7th from Havana on route to Britain. Realizing the implications, Captain Wilkes quickly met with his second in command, Lieutenant Fairfax, and after much discussion came to the conclusion that the two diplomats could be considered contraband and able to be seized by them.
They made way for what the Captain considered to be the route the Trent would take, the Bahama Channel. Indeed, the Trent left on schedule from Havana with Mason and Slidell, as well as their secretaries, Slidell's wife and three children. By noon of November 8th, lookouts atop the masts of the San Jacinto espied the Trent steaming toward them. The San Jacinto fired a warning shot across the other's bow, which Captain James Moir chose to ignore, though the second shot from a front pivot gun which landed right in front of the Trent did cause him to quickly give orders to stop. Captain Wilkes aboard his frigate gave Lieutenant Fairfax the following orders:
"On boarding her you will demand the papers of the steamer, her clearance from Havana, with the list of passengers and crew.
Should Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustice [sic] and Mr. McFarland be on board make them prisoners and send them on board this ship and take possession of [the Trent] as a prize.… They must be brought on board.
All trunks, cases, packages and bags belonging to them you will take possession of and send on board this ship; any dispatches found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession of those on board the steamer, will be taken possession of, examined, and retained if necessary." 1
Fortunately for both sides, Lieutenant Fairfax was much more level headed than Captain Wilkes, who while being known as a brave and courageous man, was also known to be quickly angered, impulsive, and overzealous. He ordered the armed men aboard the two cutters sent over to the Trent to remain in their boats while he boarded the ship. He was immediately met by an irate Captain Moir, whom he showed his orders to. Sputtering with rage, Moir immediately refused the request for the passenger list, as he and the other crew and passengers made bodily threats to Fairfax's person. The armed men aboard the cutters heard this, and boarded the Trent to protect him. However, as matters escalated, Mason and Slidell came forward and declared their names. Captain Moir also refused to let the Yanks search his cargo, and Fairfax declined to force the issue, as he knew this would become an international incident, and wished to minimize it as much as possible. While Mason and Slidell refused to voluntarily be captured, they put up no resistance when the San Jacinto crew manhandled them onto the cutters. The secretaries were also taken, but Fairfax refused to take the Trent as a prize, arguing to Wilkes once he was back aboard the frigate that it would leave the San Jacinto dangerously undermanned. Wilkes agreed, and the Trent was allowed to continue on it's route to England.
The San Jacinto made for Hampton Roads, VA, arriving on November 15th. Wilkes sent a telegram to Washington to inform them of the capture, and was wired back orders to proceed to Boston, where the two men would be put into Fort Warren, the POW prison there.
News hit the presses by the 16th, and by the 18th all the public in the North was focused on it. Many of the newspapers were making legal arguments supporting their capture, and many lawyers came forward to similarly support Captain Wilkes' actions. The exultation across the North was more temperate in the Government, which had to deal with the repercussions. The British first learned of what happened on November 27th, and their reaction got back to America on December 15th. The Prime Minister had furiously demanded that the prisoners be released and that an official apology be given. Congress debated what was to be done and sent the matter to committee, which awaited the official British response to arrive by December 18th.
Previous to the affair being known, the matter of what would happen had been debated in Britain as well, and the official statement of the Law Officers of the Crown was that:
"The United States' man-of-war falling in with the British mail steamer [this was the example used in the hypothetical submitted by the cabinet] beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom might cause her to bring-to, might board her, examine her papers, open the general mail bags, and examine the contents thereof, without, however opening any mail bag or packet addressed to any officer or Department of Her Majesty's Government.
The United States' ship of war may put a prize-crew on board the West India steamer, and carry her off to a port of the United States for adjudication by a Prize Court there; but she would have no right to move Messrs. Mason and Slidell, and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage." 2
The same day the above was released, Prime Minister Palmerston personally met with US diplomat Adams to say that a few more Confederates in England still would not change their position, and Adams replied to assure that the orders of Commander Marchand aboard the USS James Adger was to seize them were they on a Confederate ship. When news reached London on November 27th, the public was outraged at the slight to British honor, and viewed the seizure as a direct and obvious violation of maritime law. The London Chronicle wrote shortly after:
"Mr. Seward … is exerting himself to provoke a quarrel with all Europe, in that spirit of senseless egotism which induces the Americans, with their dwarf fleet and shapeless mass of incoherent squads which they call an army, to fancy themselves the equal of France by land and Great Britain by sea." 3
Fortunately, after the initial response, the British press refrained to a more moderate stance that advocated that people stay calm and not perceive the actions in only the worst way. The Law Offices of the Crown were again called on for an official statement, to which they said that while international law was not breached as per the boarding of the Trent since it was not taken as a prize, the taking of the two diplomats was a breach that required reparations. Queen Victoria was given the draft of the dispatch to be sent to Lord Lyons, but she had Prince Albert take a look at them. Lying in bed at the time in the last throes of his fight with typhoid, Albert did look at them and saw them as too belligerent. He drafted a softened version, which was included in the official statement sent to Lyons on November 30th, which while it disavowed any possible Union intent to dishonor the British flag, did still request an apology and immediate release of the two diplomats.
Preparations began to be made by Britain to guard against a possible invasion by Union forces into Canada. By mid-December, 18 transport ships had shipped over troops that reinforced the 5,000 regular troops to be more along the lines of 18,000, along with the twelve batteries of artillery, with plans to increase this to be 110,000. However, plans were put aside once news of the resolution reached Canadian military headquarters in late December.
On December 27th, the US released it's official response, which focused primarily on that the prisoners would be released, though no official apology was given as asked. Indeed, Mason and Slidell were released from Fort Warren and boarded the HMS Rinaldo in Provincetown, MA. The American public, then less jubilant and more tempered by the implications of the incident, were generally supportive of their release. A few people, such as Captain Wilkes, viewed it as ""as a craven yielding and an abandonment of all the good … done by [their] capture." 4 News reached Britain on January 8th, and was viewed as a great victory for the honor of the nation and the upholding of maritime law.
The crisis was officially over. Britain and France both secretly considered extending formal recognition or suggesting mediation for the sake of humanitarianism, which was intensified when news of the carnage that was the Battle of Shiloh reached European shores. However, it was the release of the Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862 that made the war more about slavery than a issue of states rights. By November of 1862, European opinion had turned to supporting the Union.
That was a long read, and I appreciate you sticking in for it all.
1. Fairfax, Douglas M. "Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell." Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North to Antietam. Ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarencce C. Buel. N.p.: n.p., 1885. 136-37. Print.
2. James P. Baxter, III. "Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865." The American Historical Review 34.1 (1928): 77-91. JSTOR. Web. 16 Nov. 2014. Link (http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1836481?ref=no-x-route:4e48b4b08c0b626c76d52a25d34f1e29).
3. Donald, David Herbert, Jean H. Baker, and Michael F. Holt. The Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: Norton, 2001. 315. Print.
4. Ferris, Norman B. The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis. Knoxville: U of Tennessee, 1977. 188-91. Print.